In a series of recent papers, Hirota and Yuen claim to have identified a fundamental flaw in the theory underlying quantum cryptography, which would invalidate existing security proofs. In this short note, we sketch their argument and show that their conclusion is unjustified-it originates from a confusion between necessary and sufficient criteria for secrecy.
The purpose of this note is to refute a critique by Hirota [1] and Yuen [2-9] concerning a basic criterion for secrecy [10, 11] , which is widely used in quantum cryptography and, in particular, serves as a basis for modern security proofs of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). We first explain this criterion and then describe Hirota and Yuen's critique as well as the error in their argument.
Secrecy in quantum cryptography. Realistic cryptographic keys (e.g., those obtained by QKD) are usually not perfectly secret. Rather, their secrecy is quantified by a parameter, ε ≥ 0, which bounds the maximum tolerated deviation from an ideal key, i.e., a key that is perfectly uniformly distributed and independent of any information held by a potential adversary. Formally, a key S is said to be ε-secret if the maximum advantage for distinguishing S from an ideal key is at most ε [13] . This definition guarantees that, in any application that is secure when using an ideal key (such as one-time-pad encryption), one may also use an ε-secret key instead, with ε corresponding to the failure probability caused by this replacement [14] . The notion of ε-secrecy enables modular proofs of security, which is why one also refers to it as universally composable (UC) secrecy.
For the considerations below, we will assume that the key S is a bit string of length ℓ (a typical value is ℓ = 10 6 ) and that ε > 0 is a small but strictly positive constant (for concreteness, one may set ε = 10 −20 , which is achievable by QKD and, at the same time, sufficient for all practical purposes [15] ).
Most modern quantum cryptographic security proofs, in order to establish secrecy of a key S, rely on a mathematical criterion introduced in [10, 11] . The criterion is based on the trace distance [16], which we denote by d(·, ·), and demands that
where ρ SE denotes the joint state of the key S and the information E held by the adversary, andρ S is a completely mixed state (corresponding to a uniformly distributed S). The use of this criterion is justified by the following implication [10, 11] (TD) =⇒ (UC secrecy) .
Recent scepticism. Hirota [1] and Yuen [2-9] argue that the standard secrecy criterion (TD) does not actually imply secrecy, i.e., that the above implication is wrong (unless the parameter ε in (TD) is chosen exponentially small in the key size). For concreteness, we refer in the following specifically to the paper by Hirota [1]. We note, however, that the argument is similar in spirit to Yuen's reasoning [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] and, in fact, based on the latter.
The critique is built upon an alternative criterion that can be used to establish the secrecy of a key S. The criterion demands that the probability P (S|E) that an adversary with knowledge E can correctly guess S is small, i.e.,
where ℓ is the length of S. It is then argued that this criterion is sufficient for secrecy, i.e., (HY) =⇒ (UC secrecy) .
This implication is correct (if one takes the approximation in (HY) to mean that the relative error between the left and right hand side of ∼ is at most ε) (TD) =⇒ (HY) .
Hirota now seems to argue that (2) and (3) together imply that (1) is wrong. This conclusion is, however, logically wrong. It would only hold if the implication in (2) went in the other direction, i.e., if (HY) was not only a sufficient, but also a necessary criterion for UC secrecy. But this is not true, as one can convince oneself by a simple example [19] .
We conclude by remarking that the claim of Hirota and Yuen, if it would have been valid, would not only shake the foundations of quantum cryptography, but have an equally drastic impact on classical cryptography, where similar secrecy criteria are used [20] . However, as shown here, their claim is false. Distribution, arXiv:1205 .5065 (2012 [14] More precisely, when using an ε-secret key S in an application, the probability of any event (e.g., that an adversary can correctly guess an encrypted message) is upper bounded by p + ε, where p is the probability of the same event in an ideal scenario, where S is replaced by an ideal key.
[15] Since ε is an upper bound on the probability of a failure caused by the imperfection of the secret key (as explained above), it is generally sufficient to choose ε smaller than the probability of a security breach due to other imperfections (e.g., a hardware problem leading to a key leakage).
[16] For two density operators, ρ and σ, the trace distance is defined by d(ρ, σ) := and (HY), one may consider the special case where E is trivial, i.e., uncorrelated to S. In this case, criterion (TD) corresponds to the requirement that the probabilities of S are on average not much larger than 2 −ℓ (the probabilities of a uniform distribution), whereas criterion (HY) demands that all probabilities of S are (approximately) bounded by 2 −ℓ .
[19] Let ε = 10 −20 and letS be an ideal (perfectly uniform and secret) key of length ℓ = 10 6 . Furthermore, let S be a key that is identical toS, except ifS is equal to the zero string,S = 0 = 00 · · · 0, in which case we set S = 1 = 11 · · · 1. Hence, by construction, the probability that S deviates from the ideal keyS is upper bounded by 2 −ℓ ≤ ε, i.e., S is UC secret. However, the probability that S = 1 is twice as large as it should be for a uniform string. Hence, an adversary guessing S = 1 would have a success probability of 2 · 2 −ℓ , thus violating criterion (HY). [20] For example, the definition of randomness extractors-a concept widely used in cryptography-is based on a classical special case of criterion (TD) (with the trace distance replaced by its classical analogue, the variational or statistical distance); see, e.g., [12] .
